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INTRODUCTION 
On October 22, 2015, President Obama exercised his veto power for 
just the fifth time to veto the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA).1 The NDAA sets out the annual budget and expenditures for the 
United States Department of Defense and specifies policies in connection 
with such expenditures. In his veto statement, the President objected to, 
among other issues, the provisions relating to detainees held at 
Guantánamo Bay.2 The President wrote that the bill fails “to remove 
unwarranted restrictions on the transfer of detainees,” and indeed 
“impose[s] more onerous ones.”3 This, President Obama argued, 
undermines the flexibility necessary to address the detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, including making determinations regarding which 
“detainees [would] remain at Guantánamo . . . when and where to prosecute 
them . . . and when and where to transfer them consistent with our national 
security and our humane treatment policy.”4 When President Obama finally 
signed the bill into law, in a signing statement he again objected to 
“language that would reenact, and in some cases expand, restrictions 
concerning the detention facility at Guantánamo Bay.”5 This language, he 
maintained, may “violate constitutional separation of powers principles.”6 
1 Jordan Fabian, Obama Vetoes Defense Bill, THE HILL (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:26 PM), 
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/257798-obama-vetoes-defense-bill [https://perma.cc/ 
D9KD-EK4E].  
2 Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 843 (Nov. 25, 2015). 
6 Id. 
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While this might be dismissed as “just politics,” the veto reflects real, 
ongoing constitutional issues. As Harold Koh recently wrote, the separation 
of powers issues presented by this bill and veto could “take us into largely 
uncharted constitutional territory.”7 Professor Koh concludes that 
presidential action contrary to these provisions “would stand even if 
challenged” based on the President’s authority  
as Prosecutor-in-Chief to “determine when and where to prosecute 
[Guantánamo detainees], based on the facts and circumstances of each case 
and our national security interests,” and as Diplomat-in-Chief and 
Commander-in-Chief to decide and arrange through negotiations “when and 
where to transfer them consistent with our national security and our humane 
treatment policy.”8  
Former White House officials Gregory B. Craig and Cliff Sloan echo 
Professor Koh’s conclusions in an editorial.9 
Professor Jack Goldsmith, however, takes issue with Professor Koh’s 
conclusions, finding “the arguments for a comprehensive presidential 
disregard of the homeland transfer restrictions are much more challenging 
than Koh portrays.”10 Professor Marty Lederman comes to a similar 
conclusion, finding that “there’s very little to be said for the merits of the 
constitutional argument [to disregard the restrictions].”11 Other authors 
have written about specific aspects of the restrictions, including Professors 
Steve Vladeck12 and Ingrid Wuerth.13 
7 Harold Hongju Koh, After the NDAA Veto: Now What?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 23, 2015, 11:46 
AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/27028/ndaa-veto-what/ [http://perma.cc/56QC-AL4G]. 
8 Id. (quoting Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015)). 
9 Gregory B. Craig & Cliff Sloan, The President Doesn’t Need Congress’s Permission to Close 
Guantanamo, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-president-
doesnt-need-congresss-permission-to-close-guantanamo/2015/11/06/4cc9d2ac-83f5-11e5-a7ca-
6ab6ec20f839_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z2UG-D3AA] (concluding Article II of the Constitution 
gives President Obama “exclusive authority to determine the facilities in which military detainees are 
held”). 
10 Jack Goldsmith, A Weak Case for the Unconstitutionality of the Detainee Transfer Restrictions 
(and a Glance at the Bigger Picture), LAWFARE (Oct. 26, 2015, 9:25 AM), 
https://lawfareblog.com/weak-case-unconstitutionality-detainee-transfer-restrictions-and-glance-bigger-
picture [https://perma.cc/UK6D-6UNT]. 
11 Marty Lederman, The Insoluble Guantánamo Problem (Part Three: Executive Disregard of the 
GTMO-to-U.S. Relocation Prohibition Is Not a Solution), JUST SECURITY (Nov. 13, 2015, 8:41 AM), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/27563/guantanamo-problem-remains-insoluble-part-three-executive-
disregard-gtmo-restrictions-solution/ [https://perma.cc/LL7N-J8GX] (emphasis removed).  
12 Steve Vladeck, The Bass-Ackwards Detainee Transfer Provision in the FY2016 NDAA, JUST
SECURITY (Oct. 1, 2015, 9:44 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/26491/bass-ackward-detainee-
transfer-provision-fy2016-ndaa/ [https://perma.cc/26BQ-NELC] (analyzing the general nature of the 
2016 NDAA restrictions). 
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This Essay takes the position that, with one exception, the 2016 
NDAA restrictions (and previous NDAA restrictions) do not violate 
separation of powers principles, despite the concerns stated in the 
President’s signing statement. Part I provides background information on 
the NDAA and the provisions within the Act relating to Guantánamo 
detainees. Part II considers the threshold question of whether Congress can 
substantively legislate through appropriations and authorizations acts rather 
than standalone legislative acts. Finding that Congress can in fact legislate 
through appropriations and authorizations acts, the Essay then turns in Part 
III to the substantive issue of whether and to what extent Congress can 
limit the President’s authority to conduct detention operations arising from 
an armed conflict. In doing so, Part III examines the legal bases for 
legislative and executive action, limits Congress can place on the executive 
power in this area, and executive action that the President has staked out as 
exceeding the limits placed on him by the Guantánamo provisions.14 The 
Essay then concludes that, with one exception, the Guantánamo provisions 
enacted to date are likely within the scope of Congress’s authority. 
I. THE GUANTÁNAMO PROVISIONS
The 2016 NDAA contains several provisions related to Guantánamo 
detainees. Section 1031 prohibits the use of funds “to transfer, release, or 
assist in the transfer or release to or within the United States, its territories, 
or possessions” any non-U.S. citizen detained at Guantánamo Bay.15 
Section 1032 prohibits the use of funds to “construct or modify any facility 
in the United States” for the purpose of accepting a detainee from 
Guantánamo Bay without congressional authorization.16 Section 1033 
prohibits the release of detainees to certain countries.17 Section 1034 
prohibits the transfer of detainees to other countries without congressional 
approval.18 Section 1040 requires that the Executive submit reports to 
Congress on the terms of any written agreements with foreign countries 
who accept Guantánamo Bay detainees.19 
13 Ingrid Wuerth, Detainee Transfer Restrictions and the Captures Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
LAWFARE (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:09 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/detainee-transfer-restrictions-and-
captures-clause-us-constitution [https://perma.cc/9DT6-GH6Z] (discussing the Captures Clause’s 
application to property, not people). 
14 This Essay collectively refers to the provisions discussed below as the “Guantánamo provisions.” 
15 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1031, 129 Stat. 
726, 968 (2015). 
16 Id. § 1032. 
17 Id. § 1033. 
18 Id. § 1034 (limiting transfers to Libya, Somalia, and Syria). 
19 Id. § 1040. 
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These provisions—or provisions substantively indistinguishable 
therefrom20—first appeared in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 
2009.21 At that time, President Obama did not execute a signing statement 
objecting to the provisions. Similar provisions arose again in the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2011, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2013, and the NDAA for 
Fiscal Year 2015. In these latter instances, President Obama issued signing 
statements expressly objecting to the Guantánamo provisions.22 With 
respect to all three bills, as well as the recently vetoed 2016 NDAA, the 
President argued that the provisions represented an unconstitutional 
intrusion upon his foreign affairs and Commander in Chief powers. 
On the conduct of foreign affairs, the signing statement accompanying 
the 2011 NDAA provides an example of the President’s concerns: the 
Executive “must have the ability to act swiftly and to have broad flexibility 
in conducting our negotiations with foreign countries.”23 With regard to 
congressional intrusion on the President’s Commander in Chief powers, the 
signing statement to the 2012 NDAA discounts attempts to control the 
disposition of detainees as an intrusion “upon critical executive branch 
authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantánamo 
detainees, based on the facts and the circumstances of each case and our 
national security interests.”24 Further, the signing statement concludes by 
finding the restrictions “hinder[] the executive’s ability to carry out its 
military, national security, and foreign relations activities and . . . would, 
under certain circumstances, violate constitutional separation of powers 
principles.”25 
The 2013 NDAA contained similar provisions to which the President 
objected in another signing statement. Here, the restrictions were critically 
broadened to include limitations on the disposition of detainees at the 
20 A change in the 2016 NDAA of note is that the process for receiving congressional certification 
for a transfer has grown more onerous.  
21 Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 319, 123 Stat. 1859, 1874–75 
(2009). 
22 Statement on Signing the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 945 (Dec. 19, 2014); Statement 
on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 2013 DAILY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013); Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2011, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
23 Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
24 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 2011 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
25 Id. 
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detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan.26 Addressing the restrictions 
related to Afghanistan, the signing statement notes that: 
Decisions regarding the disposition of detainees captured on foreign 
battlefields have traditionally been based upon the judgment of experienced 
military commanders and national security professionals without unwarranted 
interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to upend that 
tradition, and could interfere with my ability as Commander in Chief to make 
time-sensitive determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in 
an active area of hostilities. Under certain circumstances, the section could 
violate constitutional separation of powers principles.27 
This dialogue reached its apogee in the President’s veto of the 2016 
NDAA. Echoing his earlier signing statements, the veto statement argues 
[t]he executive branch must have the flexibility, with regard to those detainees
who remain at Guantánamo, to determine when and where to prosecute them,
based on the facts and circumstances of each case and our national security
interests, and when and where to transfer them consistent with our national
security and our humane treatment policy.28
II. LEGISLATION THROUGH APPROPRIATION AND
AUTHORIZATION ACTS 
Before considering the substantive constitutional issues raised by the 
Guantánamo provisions, there exists the threshold issue of whether 
Congress can effect these detention directives through an appropriations or 
authorization bill. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue head-on, 
but two of its decisions are helpful in this regard. In short, case law 
indicates that where Congress may not intrude on executive authority 
directly, it may also not so intrude through appropriation or authorization 
acts. 
The Court first examined a similar issue in United States v. Klein,29 a 
case arising in the aftermath of the Civil War. On December 8, 1863, 
President Lincoln issued the Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction, 
which pardoned supporters of the Confederacy and offered full restoration 
of any property seized on the basis of Confederate support upon an oath of 
26 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 1025, 126 Stat. 
1632, 1913 (2013). 
27 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, 2013 DAILY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 4 (Jan. 2, 2013). 
28 Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, 2015 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 750 (Oct. 22, 2015). 
29 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). 
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loyalty to the federal government.30 The estate administrator for a decedent, 
who qualified under the pardon, petitioned the courts for the proceeds from 
the sale of cotton that had been confiscated from the decedent.31 The Court 
of Claims awarded the proceeds to the estate and the Supreme Court 
affirmed the ruling after the government filed an appeal.32 During the 
appeal, and in response to a similar Supreme Court case,33 Congress passed 
a law that prohibited the introduction as evidence of the President’s pardon 
in a claim action against the government.34 
The Court struck down the new law, ruling that it infringed on “the 
constitutional power of the Executive.”35 Recalling the intention of the 
Constitution to establish coordinated but independent branches of 
government, the Court noted “the executive alone is intrusted [sic] the 
power of pardon; and it is granted without limit.”36 “[T]he legislature 
cannot change the effect of such a pardon,” the Court continued, “any more 
than the executive can change a law.”37 This, then, is an example of an 
instance in which the judiciary barred Congress from invading a sphere of 
power exclusively reserved to the Executive. 
The Court addressed a related issue almost eighty years later in United 
States v. Lovett.38 There, the issue concerned a provision of an 
appropriations bill which provided that “no salary or compensation should 
be paid” to certain federal employees who had been indicted by the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities.39 Affected employees challenged 
the bill as, alternatively, an unlawful bill of attainder, a due process 
violation, and an unconstitutional “encroachment on exclusive executive 
authority,”40 since “the power to remove executive employees [is] a power 
not entrusted to Congress but to the Executive Branch of Government.”41 
30 Proclamation No. 11, 13 Stat. 737 (Dec. 8, 1863). 
31 Klein, 80 U.S. at 132. 
32 Id. 
33 See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870) (affirming an award of proceeds to 
a plaintiff who complied with the President’s pardon requirements). 
34 See Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (1869–71) (“[N]o pardon or amnesty granted 
by the President, whether general or special, by proclamation or otherwise, nor any acceptance of such 
pardon or amnesty, nor oath taken, or other act performed in pursuance or as a condition thereof, shall 
be admissible in evidence on the part of any claimant in the court of claims as evidence in support of 
any claim against the United States . . . .”).  
35 Klein, 80 U.S. at 147. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 148. 
38 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
39 Id. at 305, 308. 
40 Id. at 307. 
41 Id. at 306. 
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The Court struck down the bill as an unlawful bill of attainder.42 While the 
Court did not rule on the separation of powers issue, they addressed two 
relevant arguments. First, they rejected the argument that the appropriations 
powers “are plenary and not subject to judicial review.”43 Second, the Court 
noted that Congress could not accomplish through an appropriations act 
that which they could not accomplish lawfully through an act of 
legislation.44 
Read in conjunction, Klein and Lovett indicate that congressional 
appropriations and authorizations acts may raise the separation of powers 
concerns raised by the President in his veto statement. For the purposes of 
this Essay, this Part demonstrates that the Guantánamo provisions may be 
unconstitutional if their effect is to intrude on powers reserved to the 
Executive, albeit through appropriations and authorizations rather than as 
direct impediments to presidential actions. 
III. DISCUSSION
In order to assess whether the Guantánamo provisions are 
substantively constitutional and what President Obama may do in response, 
it is essential to examine the interaction of constitutional powers and duties 
vested in the Executive and in Congress. This Part performs that analysis. 
Section A considers what constitutional provisions grant Congress 
authority to enact the Guantánamo provisions. Section B then sheds light 
on the authority vested in the President by Article II. Section C zeroes in on 
congressional and presidential authority for detention, and Section D closes 
the analysis by considering the consequences of the President acting 
contrary to congressional acts purporting to grant or limit detention 
authority. 
42 Id. at 315. 
43 Id. at 307. 
44 Id. at 316–17 (“No one would think that Congress could have passed a valid law, stating that 
after investigation it had found [plaintiffs] ‘guilty’ of the crime of engaging in ‘subversive activities,’ 
defined that term for the first time, and sentenced them to perpetual exclusion from any government 
employment. Section 304, while it does not use that language, accomplishes that result. The effect was 
to inflict punishment without the safeguards of a judicial trial and ‘determined by no previous law or 
fixed rule.’ The Constitution declares that that cannot be done either by a State or by the United States.” 
(footnote omitted)); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671, 684 n.17 
(D.D.C. 1988) (“Congress cannot accomplish that which by direct legislative action would be beyond 
its constitutional authority.” (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316)), vacated sub nom. Am. Foreign Serv. 
Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of 
Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 255 (1991) (striking down a “‘Board of Review’ composed of nine 
Members of Congress and vested with veto power” over the Metropolitan Washington Airports 
Authority as an unconstitutional restriction on executive power). 
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A. The Basis of Authority for Legislative Action
If we accept the idea that “Congress cannot accomplish that which by 
direct legislative action would be beyond its constitutional authority,”45 
then, presumably, the converse would be also be true: What Congress can 
do through a lawful act of legislation it can do through an appropriations or 
authorization bill. In order to determine whether Congress lawfully enacted 
the Guantánamo authorization and appropriation provisions, then, the 
relevant inquiry is: What is the constitutional basis for direct congressional 
action on these issues? 
The constitutional authority for the NDAA can be found in Article I, 
Section 8 of the Constitution. This foundational provision provides that 
“Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . . .”46 Relevant to the Guantánamo detainee 
issue, however, Congress appears to be attempting not simply to fund the 
government, but rather to control the foreign affairs of the country. The 
Constitution contains scant direct support for any such congressional 
authority. In the area of foreign affairs generally, express congressional 
powers are limited to the declaration of war,47 the regulation of commerce 
with foreign nations,48 the advice and consent role in approving 
ambassadors,49 and the spending power.50 
In contrast, Congress finds myriad authorities specifically regarding 
defense-related legislation, including the power to “provide for the 
common Defence,”51 “[t]o raise and support Armies,”52 “[t]o provide and 
maintain a Navy,”53 “[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces,”54 and “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and 
Water.”55 Collectively, these authorities—taken together with the 
45 Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps, 688 F. Supp. at 684 n.17 (citing Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316). 
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
47 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
48 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
49 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
50 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
53 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
54 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
55 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause56—create expansive powers regarding the 
military and, by extension, military affairs to include detention operations. 
As early as 1800, in Bas v. Tingy, the Court found the Congress can 
declare war with a scope of their choosing.57 The next year in Talbot v. 
Seeman, the Court found “[t]he whole powers of war being, by the 
constitution of the United States, vested in congress.”58 The Court 
reaffirmed the breadth of congressional powers over military affairs in 
United States v. O’Brien, where the Supreme Court found that “[t]he 
constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make 
all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping.”59 Despite 
far-reaching endorsements of congressional powers to regulate the military, 
in practice Congress has rarely intervened in the conduct of detention on 
the battlefield.60 
B. The Basis of Authority for Executive Action
Though broad and sweeping, congressional powers regarding military 
affairs are not plenary. As with congressional powers, there are ample 
constitutional sources of executive authority in this area.61 Of the 
56 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Congress shall have the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
57 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43 (1800) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“Congress is empowered to declare a 
general war, or congress may wage a limited war . . . .”). 
58 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28 (1801). 
59 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983) (affirming 
Congress’s power to establish “the framework of the Military Establishment”). 
60 See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (discussing how the War Powers have 
been treated by the Executive and Legislature since 1789, and concluding that Congress has historically 
placed legislative restraints on the conduct of wars); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The 
Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 712–20 (2008) (assessing the structural and historical reasons for the current 
debate over the President’s assertion of a unilateral authority over the use of force); Christopher M. 
Ford, From Nadir to Zenith: The Power to Detain in War, 207 MIL. L. REV. 203, 204 (2011) 
(recognizing the tension between congressional and presidential power regarding the power to detain 
individuals on the battlefield). 
61 Beyond the specific constitutional provisions discussed below, some scholars have pointed to the 
textual construct of Article I and Article II and have argued the grant of powers in Article II are 
inherently permissive, whereas Article I only provides powers that are expressly granted. See Saikrishna 
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 256–
57 (2001) (“Yet when one compares the introductory clauses of the first three Articles, the Article II
Vesting Clause must be read as a grant of power. The Article I Vesting Clause explicitly indicates that
Congress’s legislative powers only extend to those powers ‘herein granted.’ The Article II Vesting
Clause lacks such language, thereby suggesting that it may vest powers beyond those subsequently
enumerated.” (citation omitted)). This argument has been the subject of considerable debate. See
generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(“I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power but
regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers thereafter stated.”); Curtis A.
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enumerated executive powers, the Commander in Chief power is by far the 
most compelling and relevant source for the President’s authority to make 
key defense policy decisions. In Fleming v. Page, the Court held that “[a]s 
commander-in-chief, [the President] is authorized to direct the movements 
of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command, and to 
employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual . . . .”62 The 
purpose of the Commander in Chief Clause is to “vest in the President the 
supreme command over all the military forces,—such supreme and 
undivided command as would be necessary to the prosecution of a 
successful war.”63 The Court reached a similar conclusion in Reid v. 
Covert, where it held that, “[i]n the face of an actively hostile enemy, 
military commanders necessarily have broad power over persons on the 
battlefront.”64 The Presidential Oath of Office, found in the Constitution, 
further affirms the role of the President as Commander in Chief; to wit, the 
President is required to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of 
the United States.”65 
A government brief in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld provides a neat synopsis of 
the President’s Commander in Chief authority in the context of detentions 
in war time: 
The challenged exercise of authority falls within the President’s core war 
powers, comes with the statutory authorization of Congress, and directly 
implicates vital national security interests in defending the Nation against an 
unprincipled, unconventional, and savage enemy. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . This case directly involves the President’s core functions as Commander 
in Chief in wartime: the capture, detention, and treatment of the enemy and 
the collection and evaluation of intelligence vital to national security. 
Furthermore, the President here is acting with the added measure of the 
express statutory backing of Congress.66 
Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
545, 546 (2004) (While not endorsing the theory, the authors note the “textual difference [between 
Article I and Article II], usually bolstered with historical materials, has long undergirded the claim that 
the Article II Vesting Clause implicitly grants the President a broad array of residual powers not 
specified in the remainder of Article II.”). 
62 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). 
63 United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895); see also Nordmann v. Woodring, 28 F. 
Supp. 573, 576 (W.D. Okla. 1939) (“[A]s Commander in Chief, the President has the power to employ 
the Army and the Navy in a manner which he may deem most effectual.”). 
64 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957). 
65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
66 Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 9, 13–14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(No. 02-6895), 2002 WL 32728567 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-
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Undergirding all jurisprudence related to military affairs is a 
longstanding tradition of deference to the Executive over military affairs. In 
Department of the Navy v. Egan, the Supreme Court held that “unless 
Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have 
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and 
national security affairs.”67 Similarly, in Youngstown, Justice Jackson 
argued that he, as a member of the Court, “should indulge the widest 
latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President’s] exclusive function to 
command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the 
outside world for the security of our society.”68 
Deference to the President’s authority extends to areas beyond 
military and defense policy. The Executive has also long been regarded as 
paramount in the field of foreign affairs.69 In United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., the Supreme Court famously—and controversially—
found that the Executive’s authority in foreign affairs represents the 
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal 
government in the field of international relations—a power which does not 
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like 
every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the 
applicable provisions of the Constitution.70 
While Curtiss-Wright has been roundly criticized for overstating the 
breadth of executive powers in foreign affairs,71 other cases have supported 
40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (granting the President authorization to use force against parties involved in 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks); Youngstown, 343 U.S at 635–37 & n.2 (Jackson, J., 
concurring)). 
67 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988). 
68 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring). But see id. at 645–46 (noting that when 
the President focuses his power domestically, the Court should not indulge the President in the same 
way). 
69 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); see also Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 n.19 (1982) (noting that the conduct of foreign affairs is one of the 
“‘central’ Presidential domains”). 
70 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Kuok, 671 F.3d 931, 
939 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the President is the sole 
organ in foreign affairs); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 578–79 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 
Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the courts broadly interpret Congress’s grants of the 
foreign affairs power to the President); cf. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62 (1981) 
(citing Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown in acknowledging the President’s role in foreign affairs, but 
discussing the difficulty of making widely applicable rules of executive power in the foreign relations 
context). 
71 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2115 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The 
expansive language in Curtiss-Wright casting the President as the ‘sole organ’ of the Nation in foreign 
affairs certainly has attraction for members of the Executive Branch. . . . But our precedents have never 
accepted such a sweeping understanding of executive power.”); Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of 
Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 379–80 (2000) (citing 
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 18–34 (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
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the idea that the conduct of foreign affairs is one of the “‘central’ 
Presidential domains.”72 
C. Congressional Limits on the Power to Detain
As the dispute over the Guantánamo provisions illustrates, there is 
fundamental disagreement between the branches regarding the nature and 
breadth of authority in the area of detentions. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court famously examined overlapping executive
and legislative authorities in the context of a national security issue. There,
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion—widely regarded as the
definitive statement on the separation of powers between the President and
Congress—articulates three situations in which the President may act,
ranging from actions consistent to those inconsistent with legislative
action.73 This framework is useful for assessing which branch reigns
supreme when Congress and the President conflict over matters of national
defense and foreign affairs.
What authority then does the Executive have with regard to detention 
operations generally? There is no constitutional provision specifically 
regarding the authority to detain during armed conflict. Where the Court 
has addressed the issue, they have simply found that seizure and detention 
of enemy combatants in armed conflict is an “important incident to the 
conduct of war.”74 Some argue that, in such circumstances, war-related 
powers “not granted exclusively to Congress are vested concurrently with 
the President and Congress, meaning that either can exercise such 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990); 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1659–61 
(1997) (detailing the critics of Curtiss-Wright). 
72 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812 n.19; see also Egan, 484 U.S. at 529; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 
540 (1985) (citing Harlow with approval); Goldsmith, supra note 71, at 1684 (“Foreign relations is (and 
is perceived to be) the President’s responsibility.”). 
73 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). First, “[w]hen the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.” Id. at 635. The 
second category includes situations where “the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority.” Id. at 637. In these situations, the President is acting in a “zone of twilight in 
which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.” Id. The third situation is where “the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress.” Id. In this situation the President’s “power is at its lowest ebb, 
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of 
Congress over the matter.” Id. 
74 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–31 (1942); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The 
capture and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants, 
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.’”) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 
317 U.S. at 28, 30). 
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authorities.”75 However, under Justice Jackson’s framework in Youngstown, 
where Congress has acted, the President “may not disregard limitations that 
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers.”76 
With regard to detentions in armed conflicts, Congress has taken a 
number of legislative actions. These include the Detainee Treatment Act,77 
the Military Commissions Act,78 and the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).79 Of these Acts, only two 
approach anything close to the directives found in the Guantánamo 
provisions. The first is the Detainee Treatment Act, a short piece of 
legislation prohibiting the “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment” of any “individual in the custody or under the physical control 
of the United States Government.”80 This is the full extent of its directives 
regarding the disposition of detainees. Notably, the Act specifically defers 
to the Executive on the tactical handling of the detainees: “[n]o person in 
the custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or 
under detention in a Department of Defense facility shall be subject to any 
treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in the 
United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation,” a 
document which is written and promulgated by a component of the 
Department of Defense.81 
The other legislative action arguably approaching control over 
detainees is the PATRIOT Act. There, at least one court found that 
“Congress carefully stated how it wished the Government to handle aliens 
believed to be terrorists who were seized and held within the United 
States.”82 In reality, however, the relevant provisions are not onerous; they 
only direct that certain individuals be charged within certain periods of 
75 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 
87 TEX. L. REV. 299, 304 (2008). 
76 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006) (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 
(Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 147 (1814) (“If, 
indeed, there be a limit imposed as to the extent to which hostilities may be carried by the executive, I 
admit that the executive cannot lawfully transcend that limit . . . .”). 
77 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
78 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
79 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
80 Detainee Treatment Act § 1003(a). 
81 Id. § 1002(a) (emphasis added). 
82 Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 248 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc), vacated as moot sub nom. 
al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.). 
110:1333 (2016) War by Legislation 
1347 
time83 and limit indefinite detentions.84 These provisions are not nearly as 
directive as the Guantánamo provisions. For example, while the PATRIOT 
Act requires the Attorney General to maintain custody over certain 
detainees, it does not direct where they are to be held or otherwise restrict 
their movement.85 The Guantánamo provisions, on the other hand, impose 
explicit restrictions and requirements on the movement of detainees.86 
Further, the PATRIOT Act concerned domestic law enforcement, while the 
Guantánamo provisions deal with individuals captured overseas in an 
armed conflict. Thus, the PATRIOT Act is not a perfect analogue for the 
Guantánamo provisions. 
Despite these varied legislative actions relating to detentions, both 
Presidents Obama and Bush relied on the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF), and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Iraq87—legislation which does not reference detention.88 Still, this reading 
remains unchallenged. 
D. Executive Action Contrary to the Guantánamo Provisions
As this Essay has shown thus far, while Congress has not legislated on 
the great majority of the general conduct of detention operations, it has 
unequivocally expressed opposition to certain actions regarding the 
movement or transfer of detainees from Guantánamo Bay.89 Any action 
contrary to these provisions would place the President firmly on the far end 
of Justice Jackson’s spectrum of authority. Here, presidential “power is at 
its lowest ebb” and requires the President to act “upon his own 
constitutional powers.”90 What inherent powers, then, does the President 
possess to make determinations regarding the disposition of detainees 
83 PATRIOT Act § 412. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, §§ 1031–36, 
1040, 129 Stat. 726, 968–73, 975 (2015). 
87 Brief for Respondents-Appellants at 14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (No. 
02-6895), 2002 WL 32728567 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)) (Bush Administration argument that “the President here is acting with the added
measure of the express statutory backing of Congress”); Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the
Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay at 1, In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) (Obama
Administration noting that “[t]he United States bases its detention authority as to such persons on the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force”). 
88 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 
116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
89 See supra notes 15–19 and accompanying text. 
90 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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captured in an armed conflict? In his various signing statements, President 
Obama eschews claims of inherent or unitary authority to act in the area of 
detention in foreign combat. Instead, he argues more broadly that the 
Guantánamo provisions intrude on two aspects of executive power: powers 
related to the conduct of foreign affairs and powers related to the conduct 
of armed conflict. This Section reviews those arguments in turn. 
1. The Conduct of Foreign Affairs—The President has argued that
the Executive “must have the ability to act swiftly and to have broad 
flexibility in conducting our negotiations with foreign countries.”91 Two 
provisions in the 2016 NDAA implicate this concern: Section 1033 
prohibits the release of detainees to certain countries,92 and Section 1034 
prohibits the transfer of detainees to other countries without congressional 
approval.93 
It is self-evident that transferring individuals captured in armed 
conflict to various countries implicates foreign affairs. As of the date of this 
Essay, the U.S. has transferred several hundred detainees to fifty-seven 
countries.94 Each move requires the identification of a transfer country, 
acquiescence by that foreign government, and negotiations between the 
United States and the transfer government regarding responsibilities for 
each government regarding the transfer. A recent move of ten Yemeni 
citizens to Oman, for instance, was the culmination of a multi-phased 
agreement that took more than a year to negotiate.95 Further, the 2016 
NDAA implicates the President’s foreign affairs power more than past 
versions of the legislation; it contains new provisions that require the 
Secretary of Defense to certify that the transfer is “in the national security 
interests of the United States.”96 
In debates over the preeminence of the Executive over Congress in the 
field of foreign affairs, Curtiss-Wright is the natural starting point. As 
noted above, the case has been widely criticized for too broadly 
91 Statement on Signing the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 10 (Jan. 7, 2011). 
92  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1033, 129 Stat. 
726, 968–69 (2015) (banning transfers to Libya, Somalia, and Syria). 
93 Id. § 1034. 
94 Andrei Scheinkman et. al., The Guantanamo Docket: Transfer Countries, N.Y. TIMES, 
http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/transfer-countries (last updated Jan. 21, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/VE9B-EKNJ]. 
95 Adam Goldman & Missy Ryan, Issue of Where to Move Guantanamo Detainees Threatens 
Closure Plan, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/guantanamo-closure-plan-suffers-setback-over-us-site-for-detainees/2015/08/10/1540c2e0-
3f68-11e5-9561-4b3dc93e3b9a_story.html [https://perma.cc/3CDN-N948]. 
96  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 § 1034(b)(1). 
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characterizing the President’s powers.97 The Supreme Court recently 
reexamined Curtiss-Wright in Zivotofsky v. Kerry and concluded “Curtiss-
Wright did not hold that the President is free from Congress’ lawmaking 
power in the field of international relations.”98 Accepting, as some might 
still, that Curtiss-Wright and other cases stand for the proposition that the 
Executive enjoys a greater breadth of powers in foreign affairs vis-à-vis 
domestic affairs,99 executive action must still “stem either from an act of 
Congress or from the Constitution itself.”100 Such action, furthermore, “is 
not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because 
foreign affairs are at issue.”101 
In Zivotofsky, the Court upheld the Executive’s actions concerning 
foreign affairs in the face of contradictory legislation. This case arose from 
the birth of the petitioner to U.S. citizens living in Jerusalem.102 
Zivotofsky’s mother sought to have “Israel” listed as the place of his birth 
on his passport and the consular report of birth abroad in accordance with 
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003. The Act states 
that “[f]or purposes of the registration of birth . . . or issuance of a passport 
of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, 
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the 
place of birth as Israel.”103 This provision, however, runs counter to long-
standing U.S. policy concerning the status of Jerusalem. In a signing 
statement, President Bush noted that this section “impermissibly interferes 
with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign 
affairs and . . .  to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the 
97 See sources cited supra note 71. 
98 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015). This case is not to be confused with Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. 
Ct. 1421 (2012), in which the Court found the political question doctrine did not bar judicial 
consideration of the issue. 
99 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 523–24 (2008) (“The United States maintains that the 
President’s constitutional role ‘uniquely qualifies’ him to resolve the sensitive foreign policy decisions 
that bear on compliance with an ICJ decision and ‘to do so expeditiously.’. . . We do not question these 
propositions.” (citation omitted)); First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 767 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (“[T]his Court has recognized the primacy of the Executive in the conduct of 
foreign relations quite . . . emphatically . . . .”); see also United States v. Kuok, 671 F.3d 931, 939 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (citing Curtiss-Wright as authority for the proposition that the President is the sole organ in 
foreign affairs); United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, 578–79 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Curtiss-
Wright as authority for the proposition that the courts broadly interpret Congress’s grants of foreign 
affairs power to the President). 
100 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). 
101 Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090. 
102 Id. at 2083. 
103 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d), 
116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002). 
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Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which 
recognition is given to foreign states.”104 
The Court found that “judicial precedent and historical practice teach 
that it is for the President alone to make the specific decision of what 
foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.”105 In contrast to the 
recognition of foreign governments at issue in Zivotofsky, there is no case 
law on point and no historical claims by the Executive—save for the Bush 
Administration106—over the inherent authority to conduct detention 
operations. Given the lack of case law and definitive historical practice, it 
is impossible to conclude that the power to conduct detention operations as 
a function of the foreign affairs power “resides in the President alone.”107 
2. The Conduct of Armed Conflict—President Obama’s second
argument concerns the “executive’s ability to carry out its military, national 
security, and foreign relations activities.”108 The Bush Administration 
expressly and consistently argued that this power included an inherent 
power to detain,109 a power the Administration noted was “at the heart of 
[the President’s] constitutional powers as Commander in Chief.”110 In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court declined to address these claims, agreeing 
instead “with the Government’s alternative position, that Congress has in 
fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”111 The Obama 
Administration, too, has relied exclusively on the authority found in the 
AUMF.112 
The Court’s failure to rule on whether the Executive has inherent 
authority to detain does not, of course, preclude the existence of such 
authority. As opposed to President Obama’s claim regarding his conduct of 
foreign affairs, where there was no historical or judicial precedent, here 
104 Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1658, 1659 (Sept. 30, 2002). 
105 Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090. 
106 See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516–17 (2004) (plurality opinion) and al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 
221 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated as moot sub nom. al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009)) (noting that 
the Bush Administration has argued that it “could detain individuals pursuant to the President’s 
authority as Commander-in-Chief.”). 
107 Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094. 
108 Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011). 
109 See cases cited supra note 106. 
110 Brief for the Petitioner at 27, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 
2004 WL 542777, at *27. 
111 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517. 
112 Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that the Obama 
Administration “clarified that it believes that its detention authority arises solely from the AUMF”). 
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there is substantial historical and judicial support for the existence of some 
inherent detention authority in the Executive’s Commander in Chief 
powers. The Executive has conducted foreign detention operations absent 
legislative action in every armed conflict in this nation’s history.113 This 
includes establishing the policies of whom, when, and where detainees 
would be taken as well as the issues regarding the disposition of detainees. 
As the Court noted elsewhere in Hamdi, “detention to prevent a 
combatant’s return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging 
war.”114 The President’s role in waging war and, by extension, conducting 
detention operations, is extensive. William Howard Taft once wrote that 
the Commander in Chief Clause precludes Congress from “order[ing] 
battles to be fought on a certain plan” or “direct[ing] parts of the army to be 
moved from one part of the country to another.”115 This passage echoes 
Chief Justice Chase’s concurring opinion in Ex parte Milligan, where he 
wrote that Congress’s war powers extended “to all legislation essential to 
the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes 
with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power 
and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief.”116 Similarly, the 
Supreme Court held in Fleming v. Page that “[a]s commander-in-chief, [the 
President] is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military 
forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them in the manner he 
may deem most effectual.”117 These holdings all highlight that the 
Commander in Chief Clause seeks to create a “supreme and undivided 
command.”118 
This is, of course, a pragmatic concern, as successful military 
operations required unified command, speed, decisiveness, and secrecy; 
traits which lend themselves, as Alexander Hamilton noted in The 
Federalist Papers, to a singular executive rather than a legislative body.119 
113 See Ford, supra note 60, at 204; see also Barron & Lederman, supra note 60, at 977 (noting that 
during the War of 1812 “Congress did pass several statutes dealing with the specific issue of prisoners 
of war, authorizing the President to make such regulations and arrangements for their safekeeping and 
support ‘as he may deem expedient,’ but only ‘until the same shall be otherwise provided for by law’” 
(citation omitted)). 
114 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 519. 
115 William Howard Taft, The Boundaries Between the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial 
Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 599, 610 (1916). 
116 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring).  
117 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850). 
118 United States v. Sweeny, 157 U.S. 281, 284 (1895). 
119 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“Decision, 
activity, secrecy, and despatch [sic] will generally characterize the proceedings of one man in a much 
more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is 
increased, these qualities will be diminished.”). 
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Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson reached a similar conclusion in a 
1941 memorandum, finding that 
the President’s responsibility as Commander in Chief embraces the authority 
to command and direct the armed forces in their immediate movements and 
operations designed to protect the security and effectuate the defense of the 
United States. . . . [T]his authority undoubtedly includes the power to dispose 
of troops and equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote 
the safety of the country.120 
Looking to both case law and past practice, the Executive exercises 
broad control over the tactical conduct of hostilities including the conduct 
of detention operations on the battlefield. Where, however, aspects of the 
armed conflict move away from the battlefield, “[t]he exigencies which 
have required military rule on the battlefront are not present in areas where 
no conflict exists.”121 Thus, the Executive’s authority over detention 
operations diminishes as those operations move further and further from 
the battlefield. 
Where Congress has not acted on the issue, the President possesses 
broad authority to conduct detention operations, because his authority is at 
its maximum. Where Congress has acted, the constitutionality of 
presidential action is contingent on the nature of the actions. Thus, a 
legislative act requiring the detention of a particular individual on a 
battlefield would be unconstitutional because it would intrude too far into 
the President’s power to exercise command over battlefield decisions. 
Conversely, legislation restricting the movement of detainees outside the 
parameters of the hot battlefield would likely be constitutional. 
Applying these principles to the Guantánamo provisions, Congress 
acted within its authority to limit the expenditure of money to transfer 
detainees into the United States. In the same vein, Congress likely 
exceeded its authority in the 2013 NDAA by including provisions detailing 
detention activities on the foreign battlefield. Here, the President’s 
authority is exclusive. 
CONCLUSION 
More than twenty years ago, Chief Justice Burger warned that “[t]he 
hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed 
the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must 
120 Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 61–62 (1941). 
121 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
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be resisted.”122 The Guantánamo provisions represent a cluster of such 
pressures. The situation is made markedly more complex by lack of judicial 
decisions on point and a lack of congressional guidance to the President in 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which expressly discusses 
detention operations. Plainly, the Executive’s authority over the conduct of 
hostilities is vast. Where Congress has expressly spoken, however—
particularly with regard to activities occurring away from the battlefront—
the Executive’s authority is diminished. Here, with the notable exception of 
the provisions in the 2013 NDAA relating to detainees in Afghanistan, the 
Guantánamo provisions likely do not unconstitutionally invade the 
President’s authority over foreign affairs and armed conflict, and thus, 
despite raising complex separation of powers questions, are likely 
constitutional. 
122 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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